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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
HAROLD E. BEST and EARL CRAIG,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 8438

BIG JIM MINING COMPANY,
A Nevada Corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 5th day of June, 195 3, Harold E. Best, a resident
of Grand Junction, Colorado, obtained a mineral lease from
the State of Utah. This lease was Mineral Lease No. 5418, and
involved the standard form development and royalty coven~nts.
Because Mr. Best is a man of limited capital he necessarily
had to borrow money to aid the financing of procuring the
lease.
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He borrowed this money from Earl Craig, who, during
the trial, was joined as a party plaintiff at the insistence of the
defendant.
Plaintiffs then began to investigate the possibility of developing the school section and determined that necessary financial support could not be obtained in Grand Junction. (R. 118)
Because of this fact plaintiffs let it be known that they were
open to offers from outside interests. Best was contacted by a
group of California residents who subsequently formed the
Big Jim Mining Company, a Nevada corporation (R. 61, R. 63).
Negotiations for the development of the school section were
entered into, which negotiations ultimately resulted in the
assignment of the school section to the Big Jim Mining Corporation (R. 63) ; Exhibit ttB", which, hereinafter will be
referred to as the agreement.
The agreement provides:
((Assignee promises to commence operations, weather
conditions permitting, as soon as reasonable."
The original lease provides as follows in the Sixth provision of Article III:
((To commence actual operations upon the land included herein on or before December 31, 1953 and
thereafter to diligent! y operate the property in accordance with the provisions contained in this lease . . ."
The consideration for the assignment from Best to the
Big Jim Mining Company is set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5
of the agreement, as follows:
((The assignee will pay to the assignor 16Y2 % of the
gross mill receipts after first deducting from the gross

2
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mill receipts 12:Y2% of said mill receipts, which said
12:Y2% is paid to the State of Uath as part of the rent
for said leasehold. The assignee will further pay to the
assignor 16V2% of all bonuses after the first deducting
12Y2% of said bonusus which said 12Y2% must be paid
to the State of Utah as further rental for said leasehold.
((Assignee promises to have a licensed surveyor survey the aforementioned leasehold immediately. If the
eastern boundary of said leasehold either intersects or
is on the line where present mine wall of deepest penetration westerly ends, the assignee will pay to the assignor the sum of $5500.00 if the survey shov1s that the
eastern line is wester! y of the present mine wall of
deepest westerly penetration then the assignee has the
right to wait until it has received the Atomic Energy
Commission drill report of uranium and vanadium of
said leasehold and only if the report is satisfactory must
the assignee pay the assignor $5500.00."
The defendant drew the agreement, (R. 10, R. 121) and
the agreement further provided for the defendant, as follows:
((The assignee at all times has the right to abandon
said mine and retain all the equipment thereon except
as forbidden by the said laws of Utah. In the event of
the abandonment of said mine, assignee must reassign
said lease to assignor.''
The lease contained a forfeiture clause for non-production
and failure to comply with the terms thereof.
The defendant had a survey made of the property to determine the eastern boundary (R. 94). It was determined that
the boundary did not fall so as to entitle Best to the contracted $5,500.00.
In the fall of the year of the contract, the Atomic Energy

3
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Commission's drill reports were received by defendant (R. 95).
Plaintiffs attempted to find the contents of these reports but
were refused access to them by defendant (R. 18). Plaintiffs
then demanded the $5,500.00 (R. 21, R. 78) and were informed by Big Jim that the Atomic Energy Commission reports
were unsatisfactory, (R. 95) and that the mining and production of the property was impossible (R. 71, R. 74, R. 75).
Herman Stern, of the Big Jim Mining Company, testified at the
trial that the defendant was under no obligation to mine the
property ( R. 12 7) . After the obvious refusal of the defendant
to mine or develop the property and pay the $5,500.00, demand was maae for the return of the property (R. 22), Exhibits tcC" and tcJ". Big Jim Mining Company, by letter of
April 30, 1954, stated that a reconveyance of the property
would be forthcoming, Exhibit HK". The Big Jim Mining Company did not reconvey, however, notwithstanding the demands
and their own promises. Best then commenced the instant action
for the return of his property.
The plaintiff Best in the prosecution of this law suit
utilized every possible means of discovery. This can be seen
from the file and record herein. The defendant Big Jim Mining
Company at no time utilized any discovery technique whatsoever.
At the pre-trial the issues for trial were stated by the Court
as follows:
nAil right. So for the pre-trial we will put this ques-

tion of law. Was this contract an enforceable contract?
That is, the first one. Then a mixed question of law and
fact. Has there been an abandonment of this contract,
Exhibit B. Another question of law and fact. Has there

4
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been a forfeiture of the defendant's right to claim under
the assignment made pursuant to this agreement? Then
another question. If there has been either an abandonment or forfeiture, what damage has the plaintiff sustained and how much ? Those are the issues in this
case. Now ordinarily I would go into more detail about
the thing but as I view it, there isn't going to be any
serious controversy over what the facts are. That's
correct, isn't it?" (P-T R. 40).
Subsequent to this defendant's counsel questioned the
issue of forfeiture and discussion followed. The Court then restated the issues as follows ( P-T R. 44) :
A. n ... I will restate the issues. Is there such a lack of
mutuality in the contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit nB," that the
plaintiff is entitled to a reassignment of the lease to
the school section described in the complaint?
((Has there been an abandonment of the contract,
Plaintiff's Exhibit nB," on the part of the defendant?
((Has the defendant breached the contract, Plaintiff's
Exhibit c c B,'' and if there has been such a breach is the
plaintiff entitled to have the school section reassigned?"
nis the plaintiff entitled to damages, and if so, in what
amount?"
After the issues were again considered counsel for defendant requested an additional issue be added which was
stated by the Court as follows (P-T R. 45):
Has there been a waiver of the abandonment
if any has occurred and a waiver of the breach if any
has occurred . . . ''
cc • • •

At the trial the evidence was presented in . regard to the
issues. Defendant Big Jim Mining Company at that time attempted to raise an issue as to real party in interest. At the

5
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instance of defendant, plaintiff moved to join Earl Craig as
a party plaintiff (R. 42). The Court did not allow defendant to
pursue questions pertaining to conceivable interests and dealings of the plaintiffs, but the Court did give the defendants the
right to pursue such questions of any person by deposition or
any discovery technique subsequent to the trial (R. 45). Defendant, apparently realizing that any such interests were nonexistent, did not avail itself of the right given by the Court
and did not in any manner attempt to utilize discovery technique in order to change the ruling of the Court, or get a new
trial as the Court had given it the opportunity so to do.
The Court completed the trial of the issues and found
them in favor of Plaintiffs.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
DEFENDANT BELOW, THE BIG JIM MINING COMPANY, ABANDONED THE MINING LEASE AND
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN IT AND
HAROLD E. BEST AND EARL CRAIG, PLAINTIFFS BELOW.
Abandonment is a legal doctrine encompassing two elements: An intent to abandon and a physical relinquishment.
Whelan v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 212 S.W. 2d 991 (Tex., Civ. App.
1948). The intention may be shown by an express intention on
the part of the lessee or assignee or by circumstantial evidence
such as non-production of the property. Hoff v. Girdler Corp.,

6
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104 Colo. 56, 88 P. 2d 100; Spies v. DeMayo} 396 Ill. 255, 72

N.E. 2d 316.
In the instant case the defendant Big Jim Mining Company not only failed and refused to develop the school section
in question thereby circumstantially fulfilling the requisite
element of intention but the company also expressly asserted
that a mining venture was out of the question and that the
property would be reconveyed pursuant to the demands of
plaintiffs. Demand for return of the property was made on
numerous occasions because defendant consistently asserted
that it had no intention to proceed and develop the property.
Exhibit ttC", a demand letter from plaintiffs' California counsel,
states in part as follows:
A. (( ... In view of nonperformance with reference to
commencement of operations relative to the properties
under said lease, demand is herewith made upon you
to reassign said lease to H. E. Best."
In answer to this letter the defendant Big Jim Mining
Company replied as follows in Exhibit ((K":
nThis will confirm our telephone conversation of
April 28th wherein I told you that the directors of Big
Jim Mining Company will execute the assignment
forthwith as demanded in your letter of April 26th.
Kindly prepare the assignment you want executed."
This exhibit was admitted through plaintiffs' Request For
Admission to be a copy of a letter nbetween plaintiff and his
agents on the one hand and defendant and its agents on the
other" and was duly admitted into evidence at the trial. At the
trial when questioned as to the intention of the defendant to

7
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return the property, Jack Egar, the President of the defendant
Big Jim Mining Co., answered and concluded as follows:
((My answer is in the letter" (R. 84).
The foregoing exchange of letters resulted after many prior
demands and conversations in regard to the defendant's abandonment of the property. Plaintiff Best discussed the possibility of re-adjusting royalty interests with Jack Egar, president
of the defendant Big Jim Mining Co., in an effort to get something accomplished in reference to the development of the
property (R. 20). Subsequent to this a demand letter was
written to the defendant, Exhibit t(J", which letter was more
than a month in time prior to Exhibit ((K" as discussed above.
Defendant considered the AEC Drill Reports as shown by
Exhibit uB".
It is obvious from all of the foregoing and other evidence
in the record that the defendant Big Jim Mining Co., concluded
to abandon the contemplated mining enterprise and reassign
the lease in question. The defendant, of course, at no time
undertook the development of the property, thereby fulfilling
the element of ((physical relinquishment" (R. 126).
The foregoing together with other evidence is more than
sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court.
In addition to the express intention, however, the record
throughout discloses the circumstantial evidence as to intention
which again irrefutably establishes abandonment on the part
of defendant.
Defendant through Mr. Herman Stern testified that the
AEC drill reports of the property were unsatisfactory.

8
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Question: "And did you so advise Mr. Best in the
opinion of the company the report of the AEC was
unsatisfactory?"
Answer: "I did." (R. 95).
Defendant's answer to plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1:
((The AEC report was unsatisfactory because the map
and drill logs showed that of the 43 holes drilled, only
5 contained ore that was commercially marketable, and
that these holes were far apart and in no definite
trend of mineralization. In addition it fuas been determined that the ore has a high limestone content."
Defendant through Mr. Egar testified to the response
received in regard to the property after various companies and
engineers had examined the reports of the property.
Answer: ((He said that he had many such reports
come to him and never had it been his experience to
have so many poor drill report holes on one property.
He cannot understand why they drilled so many.''

(R. 74)
Answer: ((yes, he notified me that after getting the
report from his geologist they had no interest in this
piece of property." (R. 75)
Question: ((Did you see anybody who was favorably
inclined toward this property?''
Answer: ((No. - - - " (R. 75).
Defendant through Mr. Stern was questioned by the court
as follows:
The Court: ('Well, but you don't have any, under
your theory you don't have an obligation other than
to investigate, you don't have any obligation to mine,
is that right?''

9
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Answer: ((We only have the obligation to mine if
it proves profitable. In other words, if there is no ore
there or would be so expensive to take out then we
don't have this obligation ... " (R. 127)
The record is replete with evidence such as this which
without any question circumstantially establishes intention to
abandon as found by the Trial Court.
In Smith v. Moody} 192 Ark. 704, 94 S.W. 2d 357, plaintiff sought to cancel a portion of a lease alleging that defendant
had abandoned and failed to attempt development work contending that the property could not be drilled except at great
loss. The court ruled in favor of the lessor and observed on
page 358 of the Southwest Reporter, stating that if the lessee's
contention were true, ((the lessees have not been damaged by the
cancellation of so much of the contract of lease as cannot be
profitably performed." See also Sander v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.J 292 U.S. 272, 54 Sup. Ct. 671, 78 L. Ed, 1255;
Romero v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.J 93 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.
Pa. 1950); Harris v. Morris Plow Co.J 144 Kan. 501, 61 P. 2d
901.
It has also been held in gas cases that an inability to
market should not permit a lessee to hold and freeze the lessor's
land indefinitely. Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis} 107 F. 2d
981 (C.C.A. 6, 1939); Hodges v. Mud Branch Oil & Gas Co.,
270 Ky. 206, 109 S.W. 2d 576; Severson v. Ba,-stowJ 103 Mont.
526, 63 P. 2d 1022.
The only defense presented by defendant in regard to
abandonment of the lease and property was to the effect that
defendant was attempting to sell the property to others-in

10
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other words, defendant had no intention of developing the
property but rather directed its efforts toward speculation.
Rice v. Lee, 44 Cal. App. 2d 909, 113 P. 2d 235, involved
an action to quiet title by the lessor of an oil and gas lease.
The lessee did not commence to drill or develop the propert~
and the Court found that the lessee did not intend to drill and
develop the property and also that the lessee intended to hold
the property for speculative purposes. On pages -236 and 23 7
of the Pacific Reporter the Court asserted the following:

(( . . . that rights granted under such leases are for
exploration and development and the courts will not
permit the leassee to fail in development and hold the
lease for speculative or other purposes . . . "
evidence and reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom are ample to support the conclusion
of the trial court that the lessees did not intend to
explore, drill and develop the demised premises, and
that such failure constituted an abandonment.''
t t

•

•

•

See also: Carlisle v. Lady, 109 Cal. App. 567, 293 Pac. 686;
Caswell v. Gardner, 12 Cal. App. 2d 597, 601, 55 P. 2d 1222;
Garrison v. Hogan, 112 Cal. App. 525, 297 Pac. 87.
Bradley v. Fackler, (Wash.) 126 P. 2d 190, sets forth
the following policy after holding abandonment existed:

ttlt would be unjust and unreasonable, and contravene the nature and spirit of the lease to allow the
lessee to continue to hold his term a considerable length
of time, without making any effort at all to mine for
gold or other metals. Such a construction of the rights
of the parties, would enable him to prevent the lessor
from getting his tolls under the express covenants to
pay the same, and deprive him of all oportunity to work

11
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the mine himself, or permit others to do so. The law
does not tolerate such practical absurdity, nor will it
permit the possibility of such in justice.''
Justice Wade dissenting in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co.,
(Utah), 185 P. 2d 747, a case which will be discussed and distinguished hereinafter, quotes from Harris v. Riggs, 63 Ind.
App. 201, 112 N.E. 36, 39:
CCThe rights granted under such leases are for exploration and development. The title of interest granted
is inchoate until oil or gas is found in quantity, warranting operation, and courts will not permit the lessee
to fail in development and hold the lease for speculative or other purposes, except in strict compliance
with his contract for a valuable and sufficient consideration other than such development."
In Brown v. Wilmore Coal Co., 82 C.C.A. 295: 153 Fed.
143, the court concluded as the trial court found in the instant
action, that a mining enterprise was contemplated. On Page
145 the court observes the following:
ccMr. Brown didn't expect to do any mining personally and he has· not, either by himself or others; his
purpose being to sell leases to others or transfer them
to some company which would operate them."
The court analyzed the intention in abandonment carefully and concluded that its essence was not a broad intention
to abandon or retain mineral rights alone, divorced from the
obligations which adhere to it under the contract, but the
intention to abandon the contemplated enterprise.
See also Paine v. Griffith, 86 Fed. 45 5, 30 CCA 182; Elk
Fork v. Jen-nings, 84 Fed. 839.

12
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A mining enterprise was without question contemplated
by the plaintiff and defendant. The assignment called for
royalty interest and development. The defendant allegedly
was capitalized to mine the property (R. 13) . At the trial
defendant through Herman Stern stated that only a qualified
obligation to mine existed (R. 127). But even more telling than
this, defendant through Jack Egar testified that the company
considered the engineering report of the property and concluded that rather than develop tbe property to interest other
people in it (R. 70).
The foregoing not only adds to the circumstantial evidence
for abandonme~nt but in and of itself is an express manifestation that the contemplated enterprise was abandoned. The
Court properly found that the enterprise contemplated by the
parties was the development and mining of the school section
and that ((the defendant in this action did abandon the said
contemplated enterprise" (Findings 6 and 8).
The position taken by defendant and appellant not only
ts against the weight of authority but is unreasonable and
unjust .To sustain defendant's theory would amount to legalized larceny. An assignment of the lease was obtained for no
consideration whatsoever save an amount to ,be paid upon
favorable drill reports plus the prime consideration of royalty
interest. Defendant then blandly asserts that it could not possibly mine the property and in fact that the property cannot
be profitably mined; that it will not in fact mine or develop the
property., Of course, contends the defendant, the foregoing
does not amount to abandonment because we J.Tlay be able to
sell the property. If this is true the next successor in interest
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could also take the same position and so on ad infinitum. The
resuit is obvious. The original lesso~ ends up giving away his
property, ~nd· received absolutely nothing. The entire chain
is contrary to the provisions of the lease, the evidence anA sound
reason. Such a position cannot be sustained.
Appellant alleged! y cites authority for its position, but an
examination of these cases indicates their distinguishing features.

Berry v. Kelly Co.J 90 Cal. App. 2d 486, 203 P. 2d 80, involved an oil lease. The defendant took possession of certain
property. A derrick was in place when possession was taken
and a 3,000 foot depth had been drilled. Portions of the acreage
were covered by sumps, a ramp, and oil saturated dirt. Mechanical failures caused defendant to have the machinery and
derricks moved. Also the defendant had been involved in litigation which had been concluded only a few days prior to commencement of the action by the lessor and before this action
was concluded the lessee had not been able to give the go ahead
to an oil company with which he had contracted tore-drill the
well and place it on production within 45 to 70 days. The court
also made spe~ial note of the fact that the lessor had ~?-ever
given the lessee notice that he may have defaulted or that any
action may be taken. The court'found that there was no ev~~ence
of an intent to abandon.
The facts of the instant case certainly in no way resemble
those last cited.

Baldwin v. Jacobs, 182 Ia. 719, 166 N.W. 271, is a farm
lease case in which the court pointed out that the defendant's
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moving to other premises would not in and of itself amount
to abandonment. The defendant affirmatively clai~ed the use
of the premises and the sale of growing crops by defendant
was considered to be usual farming practice. Had the defendant
notified the plaintiff that the farm was worthless, that the soil
was not conducive to growth, that farming on the land could
not be profitable, and that he was going to reassign the lease
to plaintiff, the decision of the court may well have differed.
Becker v. Rute, 228 Ia. 533, 293 N.W. 18, is a landlord-

tenant case wherein the tenant surrendered the premises to the
landlord after receiving notice of forfeiture. The tenant then
brought action for the rent which the landlord subsequently
received, claiming abandonment thereby entitling the tenant to
a mitigation of damages. The court held that the duty of the
landlord to minimize damage pertained only to abandonment
and not to a surrender under a forfeiture notice.
It would appear that this case is interesting but meaningless insofar as the instant action is concerned. The case obviously involves a legal incident of abandonment, that being
the duty to mitigate damage. This duty under Iowa law is not
present in forfeiture through contract provision. Nothing can
be gained here by an academic discussion with the appellant
as to jhe legal incidents of abandonment and forfeiture. The
case is obviously not in point.
~:.

Crane v. French, 39 Cal. App. 2d 642, 104 P. 2d 53, in-

volved a situation where the only evidence presented by the
plaintiff to establish abandonment was the fact that defendant
was not on th~, premises. This is not comparable to the instant
case and distinguishable on that basis.
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Fischer v. Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P. 2d 95, was
a policy decision rendered by the California Court. The lessee
had failed to continue to develop certain oil properties. Lessee
after demand refused to further deyelop because of flooded
market conditions but stated that drilling would proceed as
market conditions improved. On Page 97 of the Pacific Reporter the court comments as follows:

((During the past few years, there has existed in
the oil industry a condition wherein the potential production is greatly in excess of market demand; ***states
and the United States government have adopted measures to control and restrict production of petroleum
to meet the market demand.''

A Kansas statute permitted only fractional production of
operating wells. In comm_enting on the apparent lack of harmony of Kansas decisions on development, the court said:
((Some of the differences perhaps may be accounted
for by the fact that through comparatively recent years
there has been generally a shifting of emphasis from
production to conservation of our natural resources.
This trend, evidenced by conservation and pro-ration
statutes and in other ways is so well recognized as to
require no comment. Courts naturally reflect this trend
by stressing the mutual interests of both the lessor and
lessee rather than the special interest of the lessor only
in securing production.''
The Court held that abandonment had not occurred. It is well
to note, however, the lang~age of the court on page 101:
((Of course if the lessee has clearly indicated by word
or conduct that he regards the tract not worth developing at any time, it may well be held that he has abandoned the lease and such abandonment calls for forfeiture and removal of the encumbrances.''
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Also note Myers v. Shell Petroleum Co., 153 Kan. at P. 296, 110
P. 2d at p. 826:
((Manifestly if the lessee thinks an undeveloped portion of his lease cannot be developed with profit to
him he rna y be required to surrender such portion of
the lease."
The appellant .~ertainly cannot contend that the market
conditions for uranium are presently comparable to those of
oil in the Fischer case. The Federal Government itself is presently guaranteeing a market and price. The cry for uranium
for the defense of this co~ntry needs no ~laboration.
I

In conclusion it must be readily seen that ample evidence
is present to sustain the trial court decision of abandonment.
The appellant has presented neither evidence nor law to support its position and the trial court decision should be sustained.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT FORFEITED ITs-·RIGHTS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE UTAH STATE LEASE FOR URANIUM AND VANADIUM.
In addition to the Trial Court's finding that defendant
abandoned the lease and the contemplated enterprise, findings were likewise entered by the Trial Court concerning a forfeiture, as follows:
((6. The enterprise contemplated by the parties was
the development and mining of said Section 16 for
commercial ore bodies with reasonable diligence and
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continuity, and when the parties in paragraphs 6, 7 and
8 of their agreement, said Exhibit HB", referred to
((mine", the reference was to the said contemplated
enterprise and not only to the tunn~l ~ereinbefore re·
£erred to in paragraph 3 of these Ftndtngs.

*

*

*

~ ~ 10.

The main and basic considerations for plain·
tiffs entering into the said assignment, Exhibit ((B",
was to have reasonably prompt development and diligent operation of the property to effect recovery of
royalties due plaintiffs under the assignment, and to
receive the payment of $5500.00 under the terms of
Exhibit HB."
t(

11. Subsequent to the receipt by the defendant of

the AEC report contemplated by said Exhibit HB",
plaintiffs made demands for the payment of $5,500.00
and on April 26, 1954, plaintiffs demanded a reas·
signment of the lease on said School Section 16 because
of the non-performance of the obligations to be performed by the defendant as provided in said Exhibit

ttB".
cc12. The defendant failed to pay $5,500.00 under

the Agreement and takes the position that said Section
16 contains no commercial ore deposits and further
contends there is no obligation under the Agreement
to mine or develop and the only obligation is to pay
rentals to the State of Utah in order to keep the Lease
in good standing; and defendant has failed and re·
fused to prosecute any mining operation or development on the property sufficient to meet its duties under
the contemplated enterprise, Exhibit ~~B", and the Lease
from the State of Utah.
·That under the terms of the Lease from the State
of Utah and the said Exhibit t'B", defendant is bound
to undertake
development work with reasonable dili,
gence.
t
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From the foregoing facts the Court concluded that the
defendant had committed a forfeiture of its rights under the
said assignment of School Section 16.
That either the theory of abandonment, discussed in
Point I of this Brief, or the theory of forfeiture, to be discussed
herein, supports the Trial Court's judgment is illustrated by
the case of Bradley v. Fackler, supra, in which the court distinguished between abandonment (intention of the lessee and
if the enterprise is abandoned the courts will afford relief by
cancellation of the least or other appropri~te remedy) and forfeiture (,which results from action of the lessor in declaring the
lease forfeited by reason of the failure of the lessee to perform
express or implied ·covenants contained in the lease) and the
court said:
((Thus, a lessee's failure to continue mining operations on the leased premises may constitute both an
abandonment of the lease and a violation of a covenant
obligating him to prosecute the rnining enterprise with
reasonable diligence."
See also 60 A.L.R. 926, wherein the editor states as follows:
CCA mining lease may be avoided not only on the
ground of forfeiture by the lessee, but also on the
ground of abandonment. In this regard there is a distinction between failure and neglect of the lessee to
develop the leased premises, or to operate the mines
or wells discovered, and the abandonment by him of
the enterprise, although in many instances the distinction is perhaps obscure. An important distinction is
that abandonmen is a question of intention; hence the
act of the lessee may indicate his intention to abandon
the enterprise he has undertaken under the lease, when
it would not be sufficient to show neglect or failure
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to develop or produce sufficient mineral as to entitle
the lessor to a forfeiture of the lease. The cases hold
that abandonment is a question of fact, and where
established affords ground for relief to the lessor by
a cancellation of the lease or other relief.''
The annotation from which the foregoing quotation was
taken begins with the case of ·Freeport Sulphur Company v.
American Sulphur Royalty Company of Texas, 6 S.W. 2d 1039.
At 60A.L.R. 890 and continuing through and including page
9 36, is an excellent annotation concerning the ((Duty of lessee
or purchaser or mineral rights other than oil or gas as to development and operation." The entire annotation is directly
in point with respect to the subject matter of this inquiry and
we strongly invite the Court's attention to the rules and cases
therein set forth. Further reference to the annotated portion
beginning at 60 A.L.R. 901 will be found in subsequent portions
of this argument.
Based on the foregoing law, if the evidence in this case
supports an abandonment or forfeiture, or both, the judgment
of the lower court must be affirmed.
Defendant and appellant contends under Point II of its
Brief that the contractura~ arrangements between the parties
cannot be interpreted as establishing defendant's duty to operate
the property with reasonable diligence. Defendant ignores or
overlooks express and implied conditions establishing such
a duty.
The allegations in paragraphs 2 through 5 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint as as follows:
((2. On or about the 5th day of June, 1953, the plain-

tiff was granted a uranium and vanadium mineral lease
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by the Utah State Land Board covering all of Section
16, Township 36 South, Range 25 East, Salt Lake
Meridian; said land being a school section situate in
San Juan County, State of Utah; said Utah State Land
Board lease being identified as mineral lease No. 5418
on the records of the Utah State Land Board. A copy of
said lease is attached hereto as Exhibit nA".
~~3.

On or about the 17th day of July, 1953, the
plaintiff assigned said lease No. 5418 to one Herman
Stern as attorney for the Big Jim Mining Company,
the defendant herein. A copy of said assignment is
attached as Exhibit nB", that on or about the 18th day
of August, 195 3, the plaintiff at the request of the said
Herman Stern acting for the Big Jim Mining Company,
and to further effectuate said agreement and assignment of July 17, 1953, as aforesaid, executed a Utah
State Land Office form assignment, assigning said Utah
State Land lease to the Big Jim Mining Company.
n4. That on or about the 12th day of November,
1953, the Big Jim Mining Company accepted said assignment and agreed to perform all covenants and obligations.
((5. That by the terms of said Utah State Land Board
lease No. 5418 actual operations on the leased land
were to commence on or before December 31, 1953, and
said leasee covenanted to diligent! y operate said property in accordance with said lease.''
Defendant's Answer admits all of these allegations in
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Hence, in construing the agreement between the parties,
it is necessary to consider not only the terms of the assignment
itself, which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit nB", but
also the terms of the Utah State Lease for Uranium and Vanadium, which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit nA", must
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also be considered as an integral part of the agreement. In
the case of Colorado Fuel and Iron Company v. Pryor, 25
Colo. 540, 57 Pac. 51, 60 A.L.R. 935, the court said:
nln construing a contract, the first point to ascertain
is what the parties meant, understood, and intended as
determined by the words employed; ... and, as an aid
in this respect, the situation of the parties, and the
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction at
the time of the execution of the contract, as also its
subject matter, and the object of the parties in making
it, may be taken into consideration ... "
The necessity of construing these documents together is
substantiated by Article VII of the Utah State Lease which
provides, as follows:
Hit is mutually understood and agreed by the parties
hereto that all of the terms, covenants, conditions, and
obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding
upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns
of the lessee."
The Utah State Lease is granted in consideration of the
rents and royalties to be paid to the State Land Board and
provides as an obligation of the lessee in Article III, Section
6, the following:
HTo commence actual operations upon the land included herein on or before Dec. 31, 195 3, and thereafter to diligently operate the property in accordance
with the provisions contained in this lease. Failure to
so continue the operation of the land included herein
for a period of more than six ( 6) months without prior
written approval of the State Land Board shall be cause
for forfeiture, and that upon the violation of this provision or any of the other terms of this lease the Lessor
may at its option after thirty ( 30) days notice by reg-
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istered mail cancel this lease. After the expiration of
the said thirty ( 30) days and the cancellation of the
lease no notice of such cancellation need be given the
Lessee.''
According to the express provisions of the Utah State
Lease the defendant is obligated to commence actual operations on the land and to ~evelop the property diligently, and
it is stated that failure in this duty will result in a forfeiture.
And yet, defendant poses the brash question: nBut where are
the provisions that were supposedly breached with regard to
operation of the property?''
Turning now to a brief analysis of the assignment of the
Utah State Lease from plaintiff Harold Best to the defendant,
which is set forth in paragraph 2 of the Lower Court's Finding
of Fact with the paragraphs of the said Assignment being
numbered by the Court for convenience. The agreement refers
to the Utah State Lease and property involved, and in paragraph 4 defendant agrees to pay to plaintiff a substantial overriding royalty. As a further covenant, in paragraph 5 of the
Assignment it is agreed that defendant will pay plaintiff an
addtiional $5,500.00 only if a contemplated report from the
AEC is satisfactory. There is no conflict in the facts which revealed that the AEC report was unsatisfactory and that the
$5,500.00 was never paid.
In paragraph 6 of the Assignment, as numbered by the
Lower Court, the parties recognized the possibility of abandonment, or paranthetically, a forfeiture, and it is stipulated that
upon the happening of the event, the defendant must reassign
the lease to plaintiff.
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It is then provided in paragraph 9 of the Assignment as
follows:
f(Assignee (defendant) promises to commence operationsJ weather conditions permiting, as soon as reasonable." (Italics added)
Defendant contends that its duties were fulfilled by the
efforts of defendant in finding persons to invest in the property
after it had determined by survey and geological reports that
the property was completely unsatisfactory for a mining operation. It is difficult to understand how the ((operations" contended by defendant as the sole extent of its duty, i.e., to find
another buyer for the property, could be delayed by weather
conditions. It is clear that the parties were contemplating the
same actual operations on the property required by the Utah
State Lease to begin on or before December 31, 1953, and in
view of the fact that the Assignment was executed in midsummer, i.e., July 17, 1953, it would reasonably be expected
that adverse weather conditions would not offer any substantial
delay.
In utter desperation to show some effort or expenditure,
defendant even contends that its capitalization and formation
into a corporation was a discharge of its duty to operate the
property diligently.
In truth and fact the record reveals no attempt whatsoever
by defendant to operate the School Section in any manner. On
pages 126 and 127 of the Transcript, Mr. Herman Stern,
Vice-President and Treasurer of the Defendant (R. 88), responded to the court's inquiry as follows:
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THE COURT: ccMay I ask a question there? This is
true, isn't it, that you had a survey made?"
A. (CCorrect."
THE COURT: ccPaid for the survey?"
A . ttyes. ''
THE COURT: ccYou have had the property examined-"
A . ttyes. "
THE COURT: (continuing) by geologists and engineers?''
A . ttyes. "
THE COURT: ((You have paid the rent for 1954
and 1955?"
A . nyes. ''

THE COURT: ((What else have you done?"
A. ((That's all the work we have done for 1954.
Fifty-five we have other plans going. In other words,
I have heard since November that there is another
working to be put in very close to the property so we
are going to send out engineers to get a new report
what's going on to see what we can do on this thing
so we can go from there.''
THE COURT: ((You don't admit that you have any
obligation to do any of those things, do you?"
A. ((We have an obligation to keep the property up,
yes, to do all the work that is required."
THE COURT: ((Well, but you don't have any, under
theory, you don't have any obligation other than to
investigate, you don't have any obligation to mine,
is that right?"
A. ttWe only have the obligation to mine if it proves
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profitable. In other words, if there is no o~e _there ~r
would be so expensive to take then v:e don t have thiS
obligation. We have to first determtne to get at the
ore to remove it and how rich it is. In other words, supposing there is no more ore on this property. Then we
may not have any obligation to mine."
THE COURT: ((But you've got to make entries and
tunnels, don't you?"
A. ((Well, you have to drill the property. You drill."
THE COURT: ((You drill it?"
A. CtFirst, yes. To determine where your tunnels are
if you're going to build tunnels or sink shafts. You have
to drill it first ?''
Defendant's own testimony recognizes the necessity of
drilling the property as an initial step in deter~g whether
ore bodies exist but no such drilling operation w~s underta~en.
The survey referted to was completed only to determine the
boundaries of the property (R. 94), and the alleged geological reports, obtained by defendant in 1954 were without
cost, from other concerns which were investigating this property (R. 127, 128).
The ill-conceived attempts to discover some third person
to whom the defendant could assign its interest is an affirmative
factor showing the complete lack of any efforts ttto commence
actual operations on the land" and ttto diligently operate the
property." In this regards, Lindley on Mines, Section 644,
states that while the general rule places the burden of proof
upon him alleging an abandonment or forfeiture, an· exception is noted as follows:
where a party shows that no work was per·
formed by his adversary within the limits of a claim
H

•

•

•
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he makes out a prima facie case and thereafter, should
such adversary depend upon labor done outside the
claim, the burden is cast upon him of proving the performance of such a labor and proving that its reasonable tendency is to benefit the claim."
Certainly plaintiffs have established by competent evidence
the complete failure of defendant to fulfill its duties with respect to this mining venture. As stated in the case of Brown
v. Wilmore Coal Co., supra, as follows:
tCMr. Brown didn't expect to do any mtntng personally and he has not, either by himself or others;
his purpose being to sell the leases to others or transfer
them to some company which would operate them."
-;~

Such an intention as indicated by the Brown case will
not fulfill obligations under a mining lease.
Unquestionably the Utah State Lease was in the immediate
contemplation of the parties when the Assignment was executed, and the parties must have contracted with respect to
the urgent need demanded by the Utah State Lease to commence
operations by December 31, 1953, in order to avoid a possible
forfeiture of rights to the State Land Board. The date of December 31, 1953, demanded by the State Land Board, by which
time actual operations must commence, and the immediate
danger of escheat of the mineral lease, prompted plaintiff
through his attorney to write the letter dated April 26, 1954
(attached to plaintiff's' re<J_uest for admission as Exhibit ~~C"
and admitted in evidence by stipulation), demanding a return
of the property for tenon-performance with reference to commencement of operations relative to properties under said
lease . . . " The parties in their agreement contemplated im-
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mediate operation of the properties, a duty which defendant
completely ignored in its abortive attempts to interest other
individuals in the mining venture.
That a court should not torture language to establish a
new contractural relationship not contemplated by the parties
is a proposition which we readily accept and accordingly endorse the principle as set forth in many of the cases cited by
appellant. Several of these cases, standing for such a proposition, will be distinguished in succeeding paragraphs of this
brief.
In the case of Howorth v. Mills, 62 Utah 574, 221 Pac.
16 5, an action was commenced to recover an installment of
purchase price past due on a contract for the sale of real property on which the defendant had paid $8,833.00 on a $16,500.00
purchase price. After judgment for plaintiff for past due installments and on appeal the defendant contended that the
seller's remedy was limited to a forfeiture. This court simply
held that under the particular contract, the seller could either
declare a forfeiture or follow the chosen remedy of suing for
specific performance, and the judgment was affirmed. The
language quoted from the case in appellant's brief on page 27
is taken out of context and under the facts of the Howorth
case has absolutely no bearing on the present controversy.
In the case of Rose v. Lanyon Zinc Company, 68 Kan.
176, 74 Pac. 625, the lessee agreed Hto drill a well upoa. said
premises within one year from this date or thereafter pay (to
lessor) Forty Dollars annually until said well is drilled ... "
The plaintiffs contended in attempting to invoke a forfeiture that it had been represented to them that the defendant
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would furnish gas for the domestic use of the family, and as
a result the defendant was obligated to drill a well. The court
applied the parol evidence rule and held that the expressed
stipulations in the agreement control oral stipulations directly
contrary to the expressed terms in writing. Oil and gas leases
of this type allowing the lessee the option to drill or to pay
a stipulated rental are widely used in this particular field and
are to be carefully distinguished from a situation where no
alternative course of action is open. In the Rose case, a duty to
develop the leased premises does an in justice to the expressed
terms of the lease. Such a conclusion is completely unwarranted
in the present case.
In the case of Johnson v. Geddes, 49 Utah 137, 161 Pac.
910, cited by appellant on page 26 of its brief as ((instructive
and important," the plaintiff commenced an action to recover
the sum of $9,000.00 from defendant as a balance due on
the purchase price for mining claims. Judgment for plaintiff
was reversed on appeal. The majority opinion devoted itself
almost entirely to an analysis of the agreement between the
parties by the terms of which defendants were given an option
to pay as the full purchase price of the claims either ( 1)
$16,000.00 unconditionally or (2) $21,00.00, $12,000.00 unconditionally and the balance of $9,000.00 to be paid out of
the proceeds of the mine. The defendant elected to purchase
the mining claims for the $21,000.00 amount, paid the $12,000':UO, received a warranty deed on the claims, and thereafter
completed no work and refused to pay the $9,000.00 for which
plaintiff brought the action. The court held that the contract
was clear and explicit, applied the parole evidence rule, and
analyzed the contract as follows:
29
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'tIn the first option agreement it is made as plain
as the English language can make it that the $9,000.00
'shall be paid only' out of the 'net one-half of the proceeds of all ores mined from said property.' Then follows the provision that the defendants' shall determine
'extent and manner of the development work.' In another part of the option agreement it was again provided that the $9,000.00 shall be paid 'in the manner
and only in the manner provided for . . . ' ".
The court reasoned that under the clear and expressed
terms of the contract defendants had no duty to operate the
properties in order to obtain proceeds from which plaintiff
would receive the remaining $9,000.00, and the court indicated
it was powerless to impose such a duty in face of the expressed
language in the agreement.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Straup admits that
the court cannot make a new contract for the parties, but he
allows that the language should be interpreted with reference
to the surrounding .circumstances and the subject matter involved, and he concludes, as follows:
"To say one had agreed to pay $9,000.00 out of proceeds of ore mined by him from the property, and then
say he was at no time required to work or mine it or
do anything to obtain ore, seems to me but contrary
propositions. I thus think the defendants had a duty
to perform and were required to make reasonable efforts to meet the payment out of net proceeds of ore,
and that they were entitled to a reasonable time to do
that.''
"To uphold the defendants in their contention would
mean that they have the sole right to say when such
unpaid balance should be paid, or that it shall ever be
paid."
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Involved in the Johnson case are many glaring factors
which distinguish the decision from the present action. The
case did not involve an action for abandonment or forfeiture;
a warranty deed ha~ transferred full title to the defendants. A
substantial part of the consideration had been paid by the
defendants, i.e., three-fourths of the amount necessary to effect
an unconditionaf purchase under one option phase of the
agreement. The additional sales price under the option accepted
by defendant indicated plaintiff assumed the risk of defendant's failure to develop the properties. According to the expressed language in the contract, little if any room was left
for interpretation by the court or application of an implied
covenant to develop the properties. None of the foregoing
factors are present in the case now before the Court. Moreover,
in the present action, not only is the Court confronted with an
agreement and circumstances from which the duty of development and operation· fairly leaps as a necessary conclusion, but
in a~dition, as subsequent portions of this argument will reveal, under these facts the universal rule is that an implied
covenant to develop and operate the properties with reasonable
diligence is a necessary, equitable, and just interpretation.
Surely, Chief Justice Straup' s c9nclusion is singularly applicable to the present case. Here the pl~intiffs have received
nothing, the defendants have not been damaged by a forfeiture
of the lease, but if defendant's interpretation is allowed, it is
likely that the plaintiffs will never receive anything from
operation of the properties.
The case of Monfort v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 67 Kans. 310,
72 Pac. 784, another of appellant's authorities, treated a
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situation where the lease express! y provided that the lessee
could retain its rights by paying specified rentals. Again, this
is no authority for the position taken by the defendant.
In the case of Meagher v. Uintab Gas Co., 112 Utah 149,
185 P. 2d 747, judgment was rendered for plaintiff in an action
to quiet title in an oil and gas lease. On appeal this Court
reversed the judgment, and in interpreting the agreement concluded that many specific provisions were set forth· requiring
substantial expenditures and development, and that these provisions were completley fulfilled by the defendant. These
conditions included such obligations as drilling until the ((Sundance formation" was pierced. The contract involved gave the
lessee a continuing interest if the lessee completed substantial
development and expended large sums, all dire~tly related to
development and operation necessary to comply with the
specific provisions of the contract. None of these factors is
present in this case now before the Court, and according! y, the
language in the dissenting opinion of Justice Wade is particularly appropriate.
Other authorities cited by appellant will be distinguished
in subsequent portions of this Brief. We now turn to an analysis
of the law with respect to implied covenants for development
and operation of properties under mining leases.
Accompanying the express provisions in the contracts
which allow for no other interpretation than the duty of defendant to operate the property with reasonable diligence and
continuity, as found by the Lower Court, a recognized principle
establishes an implied condition for operation and development when one of the main considerations for the mining
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lease is the payment of royalties out of operations. As indicated
in the foregoing, both the Utah State Lease (Exhibit nA")
and the agreement (Exhibit (CB"), provide for the payment
of substantial royalties to the State Land Board and to plaintiffs,
respectively.
The implied obligation is two-fold: first, to develop; and
second, to operate. With respect to the implied obligation to
develop, in 60 A.L.R. 901, the editor states the policy considerations and the rule, as follows:
teA lease of land for the exploration and development
of minerals is executed by the lessor in the hope and
upon the condition, either express or implied, that the
land will be developed for minerals. Hence, it would be
unjust and unreasonable, and contravene the nature
and spirit of the lease, to allow the lessee to continue
to hold the land for any considerable length of time
without making a reasonable effort to develop its according to the express or implied purpose of the lease,
even though there is a provision in the contract for the
payment of a minimum royalty.
((Hence, where the consideration for the lease of
land for the mining of minerals therefrom is the agreement by the lessee to pay a royalty on the product
mined, this stipulation is construed to indicate it to
be the intention of the parties that the lessee shall
develop the leased premises for minerals to the mutual profit of himself and the lessor, and from this
presumed intent there springs the implied obligation
on the part of the lessee to develop the premises and
mine the product within a reasonable time."
Concerning the obligation to operate after appropriate
development of the properties, in 60 A.L.R. 904, the rule is
stated as follows:
33
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nln the absence of any express covenant upon the
subject, there is an implied covenant that the lessee
in a mining lease, if ore is disclosed which may be
profitably mined, will use ordinary diligence in working
the mine and securing the product, if the terms of the
lease disclose that the lessor's share of the product
mined, or a royalty, is the real consideration for his
entering into the lease.''
In the case of Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Company, 41
Ariz. 376, 18 P.2d 649, the plaintiffs contended in an action
to quiet title and cancel a lease of feldspar properties that the
lease was void for want of mutuality since the sole consideration accruing to the lessor is a promise to _pay a royalty and the
lessee is given the sole and absolute right to terminate and
concel the lease without liability. The court looked with favor
upon this proposition which bea~s consideration in other points
of the present appeal. The important p?ase of the case is
plaintiffs' contention that an implied covenant existed obligating the lessee to ((prosecute the work of mining and shipping
with reasonable diligence and continuity of effort, and the
failure or refusal of the lessee to so prosecute such work constitutes a breach of contract and a failure of consideration
which entitled the lessor to have such lease cancelled and to
be restored to possession." The court endorsed the contention
and said:
t(Again we think plaintiffs have correctly stated the
general rule of law. While it is true that a large number, if not the majority of cases upholding this principle have arisen where the lease was for oil or gas
lands, we are nevertheless impressed that the same
rule in reason should apply to mineral lands of any
character. When mining operations are leased on a
royalty basis, the only way in which the lessor can get
34
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anything for his property is through the lessee's working
it. It is obvious that no sane man would execute such
a lease unless he believed the lessee would at least
make a reasonable effort to develop the premises, and
we think that a lease which provides tbe sole or the
main consideration moving to the lessor is to be a
royalty from the proceeds of the mine implies a covenant for diligent operation and imposes on the lessee
the duty of proceeding in that manner, and his failure
or refusal so to do warrants the lessor in cancelling the
lease." (Italics added.)
In paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact entered by the
Lower Court it is stated, as follows:
~~The

main and basic considerations for plaintiffs
entering into the said assignment, Exhibit ~ B' ', was to
have reasonably prompt development and diligent
operation of the property to effect a recovery of royalties due plaintiffs under the assignment, and to receive
the payment of $5 500.00 under the terms of Exhibit
c

~~B''.

Appellant in its argument raises the rather unusual contention that all plaintiff Harold Best expected to receive from
the operation was the payment of $5,500.00 under the terms
of the assignment. Certain! y the receipts of the money was of
great importance to Mr. Best. However, it is inconceivable
that the fund could be the sole or even a substantial consideration for the agreement. In the first place, according to the
assignment, Best was not to receive t&e $5,500.00 unless an
operating mine was located on the property or unless the AEC
report was satisfactory. Upon the satisfaction of either of
these condition_s the $5,500.00 would be paid but not until
then. Hence, when the fund is~ paid, the defendant is virtually
assured of commercial property with the result that the $5500.00
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would be of minor importance and the over-riding royalty due
Mr. Best woudl be of major importance. As stated by the
Lower Court on pages 146 and 147 of the transcript:
(( . . . The other significant feature of the contract
is one to the effect that the assignee promises to commence operations, weather conditions permiting, as soon
as reasonable. I have listened to the testimony in this
case and the arguments of counsel and their various
contentions. It is contended by the defendant that the
basic reason for the, Mr. Best, one of the plaintiffs,
entering this contract was to obtain the fifty-five hundred dollars. Well, I will agree that that was one of
his basic objects was to receive the fifty-five hundred
dollars. But I think also the other inducement and basic
object of entering the contract was to have reasonably
prompt development of the property in order that he
might, if it were possible, recover the royalties that
this contract reserved to him, because in a situation now
according to the plaintiffs' contention, he has no obligation to do anything more than- keep the lease to the
State in good standing. Well, that couldn't possibly
be of any benefit to the plaintiffs unless the property
is mined. Now I can't write any provisions into this
contract. The contract is silent upon what will be the
situation if the survey reveals that the tunnel didn't
penetrate the easterly boundary of Section 16. And if
the A.E.C. prospecting didn't reveal the presence of
ores. But as I listened to this testimony I put this,
arr~ve at this conclusion from the conduct of the parties
as revealed by this evidence that if there was no ore
revealed in the prospecting of the A.E. C. that the defendants would be under no -further obligation in this
contract."
On September 9, 1953 plaintiff Harold E. Best wrote a
letter to defendants' Agent (Exhibit ttA" attached to plaintiff's
Request for Admission admitted in evidence by stipulation) in
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which the over-riding royalty is considered of such substantial
importance that Mr. Best discusses the nhaula~e allowance"
and other questions with respect to the royalty due. Mr. Best
indicates that he woud waive the ((haulage allo~ance" which
would be a minute part of the money to be received under the
royalty arrangement, if defendant would pay over in cash the
sum of $2,500.00.
The over-riding royalty was one of the main and basic
considerations !or the agreement.
If the court should abide by defendant's position in this
matter not only would plaintiffs be deprived of the $5,500.00,
since the conditions for payment of that amount were not fulfilled, but in addition plaintiffs would be deprived of their
royalties under the agreement since defendant contends that
it has no obligation to develop or operate the properties. Such
an interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the parties
contracted with the intention of having the property escheat
to the State Land Board, a result which plaintiffs would be
powerless to avoid unless the lease is cancelled.
Another case illustrating the application of the doctrine
of implied covenant is Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Clayton
Coal Company, 110 Colo. 334, 134 P.2d 1062, in which the
plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title against the defendantlessee under a lease for mining and marketing coal. The lower
court found that the consideration for the lease was the agreement to pay royalties; that it was therefore the duty of defendant
to prosecute the work with reasonable diligence which defendant failed to do; and that thereby defendant forfeited and
abandoned the lease. On appeal judgment for plaintiff-lessor
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was affirmed. The court held that the lease was abandoned
and forfeited by defendant and stated:
(( (where a consideration was receiv~d) fo~ the right to
explore, develop and remove the mmeral 1s a royalty,
the courts have read into the lease the implied covenant
to develop and operate with reasonable diligence. (Citing authorities). This rule applies to minerals in place
such as coal, as well as to oil and gas." (Citing authorities)
See also the case of Cotner v. Mundy, 92 Okla. 268, 219
Pac. 321, involving a sand and gravel lease.
Other cases cited by appellant lose all of their authority
when viewed in the light of facts and circumstances then existing. The case of Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Company, supra, cited on page 18 of Appellant's Brief, actually stands as authority for imposition of the implied
covenant to develop and operate mining properties with reasonable diligence. The case expressly holds that unless otherwise provided in the instrument, there is an implied covenant
by the lessee who is to receive a royalty that the tract will be
prudent! y developed. The court cites many authorities on page
99 of the Pacific Reporter to substantiate this rule. In the
Fischer case, however, the lessee had drilled the property and
had discovered a producing well. Also, other extensive drilling
had resulted in dry holes. Another distinguishing factor is
that the United States and the State of Kansas had adopted
policies and measures to control and restrict the production
of oil due to the fact that potential production was greatly
in excess of market demands. No such factor may be found
in the present case where national defense and government
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policies reflect the need for immediate production of uranium
indicated by a production bonus system.
Again, the case of Caine v. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69, 106
Pac. 945, cited by appellant on page 20 of its brief, is no
authority for the propositions which defendan~ attempts to
.support. The Caine case ~oncerns the sale or transfer of an
option to purchase, and the case simply holds that the assignee
should not be bound to pay the purchase price without exercising the option. The case is the furthest thing from an
analogy to the present action and is not in point.
Similarly, in the case of Alford v. Dennis. (Kan.)
170 Pac. 1006, a portion of the land, originally covered by
one contract of ,lease, had been assigned and the assignee contended that it was implied that a covenant to develop covered
his portion of the property separate and apart from the property
as a whole. The court held that the lessee had fulfilled its
duties under the lease of the original properties and that there
was no implied covenant to develop that small portion of the
properties ultimately assigned to plaintiff. The obligations
to develop had been fulfilled by the drilling of a total of 2 5
wells on the leased tract. In the light of these factors, the
case is completely distinguished from the present action.
The case of Chandler v. Hart, 161 Cal. 445, 119 Pac. 516,
concerned the lease of land for a term of years with a full
consideration in the form of stock paid at the time of execution
of the lease. The court said:

uwe know of no rule declaring that a demise of land
for such purposes, upon a full consideration received
in advance, is forfeited by a failure of the lessee to

39

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

develop and extract the oil, unless such a right of forfeiture is reserved in the demise, either expressly or
by necessary implications from the expressed terms."
(Italics added)
The court in the Chandler case reasoned that no implied
covenant applied since the entire consideration was received
in advance, no royalties haying been reserved. Situations where
leases are executed for the purpose of making a discovery of
oil are carefully distinguished, in which latter event the court
announced:
(( ... the estate and right of possession of the lessee
in the premises ceases if he does not diligently prosecute
to success the work of discovery and the work of extraction after discovery.''
And so many of the cases cited by appellant when properly
viewed in the light of the circumstances then existing stand as
authority for the action of the Trial Court in the present case.
The case of Munson v. A. & H. lnv. Company, 62 Utah
13, 218 Pac. 109, involved an action for recision of a contract
for the sale of an interest. in an apartment house. The great
body of judicial authority. in Utah and elsewhere concerning
the failure to perform conditions of payment under contracts
for the purchase of real property under no conceivable circumstances. may be used as authority for duties imposed under
a mineral lease when the lessor reserves a royalty interest in
the leased property.
In answer to defendant's contention that the Court should
not have imposed the relief of forfeiture, we invite attention
to plaintiffs' authorities briefed in the foregoing where a forfeiture was the natural and immediate result of a breach of
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conditions to develop and operate the properties with reasonable diligence. While in some other fields of the law forfeitures are considered as rather a harsh remedy, in the area
of mining leases all of the equities favor a forfeiture. The
rule is stated in 60 A.L.R. 922, as follows:
uWhile equity generally abhors a forfeiture, and
will refuse to enforce a provision therefor, yet when
such a forfeiture works equity and is essential to public
and private interests in the development of minerals
in land, the landowner as well as the public will be
protected from the laches of the lessee, and a forfeiture
of the lease will be decreed, where such forfeiture does
not contravene unambiguous stipulations in the lease,
and is based upon the neglect and failure of the lessee
to explore the leased land for minerals and take the
to the production of minerals, if there
steps necessary
,
are any.
The many authorities cited in A.L.R., after the foregoing
rule is announced by the editor, impel the conclusion that
declaration of a forfeiture is the favored remedy.
As stated in Conrad v. Morehead, ( 1883) 89 N.C. 31, as
follows:
(Cit would be unjust and unreasonable, and contravene the nature and spirit of the lease, to allow the
lessee to continue to hold his term a considerable length
of time, without making any effort at all to mine for
gold or other metals."
In addition to the necessary conclusion that reason and
justice support the remedy of forfeiture, II American Law of
Property 680 recognizes that when there has been no production upon the claims then there is no measure of damages
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and the remedy at law is inadequate, and the only conceivable
remedy is termination of the interest.
Again, appellant makes a glaring attempt to torture
general rules taken from unrelated fields of the law to substantiate its contentions.
The defendant did nothing which could be conceived as
reasonably calculated to operate and develop the properties.
The duties imposed by the contract and implied by the law have
resulted in the necessary and equitable forfeiture of the lease
and the action of the Trial Court in this regard should not be
disturbed.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORT A
FINDING OF LACK OF MUTUALITY IN THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT.
It is admitted that the trial court did not explicitly find
or conclude that the agreel?ent was unenforceable for reason
of lack of mutuality. For that reason defendant's argument
on this point is surplusag~. It is obvious that either abandonment or forfeiture sustains the decision of the trial court.
If a finding of mutuality be ~eemed implicit and necessary
to support the Trial Court's judgment, such a finding is supported by the evidence. The agreement provides as follows:
nThe assignee at all times has the right to abandon
said mine and retain all the equipment thereon except
as forbidden by the said laws of Utah. In the event
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~\~l:~f;j~:,j;~~~·j~'

of the abandonment of said mine, asstgnee must reassign said lease to assignor.''
It is also well to note in relation to this clause that the
defendant drew the agreement (R. 10, R. 121).

Petroleum Co. v. Coal, Coke and Manufacturing Co., 89
Tenn. 381, 18 S.W. 65, indicates certain factors which would
support lack of mutuality in an option case. The lessee had
option to develop, and mine, and any penalty provision was
lacking. From these factors the court concluded a lack of
mutuality existed. See also Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Company, supra.
Defendant through Herman Stern testified as follows in
answer to the obligation of mining:
((We have the obligation to mine if it proves profitable . . . ''
In other words, defendant, under its own theory of the
case, has the exclusiv~ option of decision under the agreement.
It is bound to do nothing insofar as mining the property is
concerned. Such an agreem_ent as conceived and drafted by the
defendant is lacking in equitable treatment of the plaintiff
and in its own necessary legal sufficiency. The plaintiffs were
rightfully restored to their mining lease by the Trial Court.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN COMPLETE HARMONY WITH THE CUSTOM OF COURTS AND THE
LAW AND PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
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CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF REAL P AR'TY IN
INTEREST.
A. Defendant did not ritise the issue of real party in interest
by affirmative defense and defendant was in no way prejudiced
by the action of the lower court.

The introductory paragraph to Point IV of appellant's
brief is ind~ed nstar~ling" as appellant contends, but startling
only because of_a completely erroneous statement of the law and
what transpired at the trial.
Defendant initially contends that its answer raised the
issue of plaintiff Harold Best's standing as a real party in
interest. Such is not the case. Defendant in paragraph 8 of
its answer alleged no more substance than the plaintiff Harold
Best had assigned his interest to another person or persons.
This in no way tenders an issue for trial.
In the Utah case of Hiramatsu v. Maryland Insurance Co.,
73 Utah 303, 309, 273 Pac. 963, plaintiff commenced an
action under a policy against his insurance company for damages to his car: The car was purchased by plaintiff from the
Service Motor Comp~ny under a title retaining contract which
was assigned to the Thatcher Brothers Banking Company, and
defendant alleged in its answer that plaintiff was not the only
real party in inetrest, but that these two concerns were also real
parties.
After judgment in favor of plaintiff and on appeal defendant contended that Thatcher Brothers Bankers and the
Service Motor Company were ((real parties in interest and not
bound by the judgment." This Court affirmed the judgment
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for plaintiff and stated at page 965 that it did not appear on
the face of the complaint that any one other than plaintiff
was a real or necessary party and that defendant attempted to
raise the issue by its answer. The Court said:
(Cit is merely alleged that they (are real parties in
interest,' but nothing is, nor are there any facts, alleged to show wherein or in what particular either of
them was a real party in interest when the action was
commenced. That was essential if the defendant desired
to enter an issue in such respect/' (Italics added)
The Court concluded that the question of real party in
interest ((presents no ruling for review, and thus shows no
error or prejudice in the premises.''
A similar case is found in Arthur S. Hoyt Co., Inc., v.
Gallagher's Warehouse, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 17a. 42, Case I
(D.C.E.D. Pa., 195 3) wherein the court stated that the second
separate defense attempts to raise the question that the plaintiff
is not the real party in interest, but the statement of it ((amounts
to nothing more than a conclusion of law without supporting
facts."
In the case of Tinker v. ·Northwest Air Lines, Inc., 16
F.R. Serv. 17a. 13 ,Case 1, 11 F.R.D. 540 (U.S.D.C., N.p.
1951), the court considered defendant's argument concerning
an assignment, the ((sole effect" being ((to constitute a different
person the owner of the claim against the defendant." Defendant's motion for a rehearing was denied and the court
quoted from Ronsenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F. 2d 406, 407,
as follows:
((Since the claim is owned and may be sued on by
someone, all a defendant may properly ask is such a
45
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party plaintiff as will render the judgment final and
res judicata of the right sued upon."
Similarly, in the Utah case of Shaw v. Jeppson,
239 P. 2d 745, plaintiff obtained an injunction against
the defendant from teaching dancing in competition with the
plaintiff. On appeal defendant raised the questio~ that plaintiff
was not the real party in interest; that rather an undomesticated foreign corporation was the real party. This Court held
that the plaintiff exacted the restrictive covenant ccfor the purpose of protecting her own interests. She is entitled to enforce
it on her own behalf." This Court held further that even if
some other person crnay incidentally derive an indirect benefit
from plaintiffs enforcement of her own rights," this would
not preclude plaintiff from enforcement. Justice Crockett,
speaking for the court, announced:
c

CCThe reason the defendant has the right to have a
cause of action prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude any
action on the same demand by another and permit the
defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the real owners of the cause."
Justice Crockett concludes with a statement which applies
with equal force to the present action, as follows:
c (Defendant will suffer no difficulty in this case on
that score."
,

And so we pose the question: Wherein lies the prejudice
against this defendant? The claim was prosecuted by the contracting parties of record and the judgment is final and res
judicata as to all rights involved. Even if we assume, which
we expressly deny, that plaintiff Harold Best throughout all
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the contractural negotiations was acting as an agent for an
undisclosed principal, Best would be liable under the contract,
hold the power to sue in his own name, the principal would
be fully bound by the action of his agent, and the ultimate
disclosure of a heretofore unknown principal could not affect
the status of the defendant. 3 C.J.S. Agency, Sections 216
and 244; Montague Manufacturing Co. v. Aycock-Hally Lumber Co., 139 Va. 742, 124 S.E. 208.
4

Let us assume further, which again is denied, that plaintiff
Harold Best assigned his interest under the contract with
defendant to some unknown third person. Could this affect
the rights of the defendant? Certainly an assignment will not
be effective and could not prejudice the rights of a contracting
party until such assignment is made known. In re Leterman,
Becher & Co., 260 Fed. 543, 171 C.C.A. 327. It is stated in
6 C.J.S., Assignments, Sec. 74, as follows:
nThe notice, however, must be sufficiently direct and
definite to enable the debtor to know of the assignment;
it should name or identify the assignee; it must be sufficently definite to enable the debtor to identify the
subject matter thereof; and it will not be effective
until actually communicated to the debtor."
Actually, if plaintiffs could not sue in this case as contracting parties and record title holders, it is difficult to imagine
anyone who could bring the action against defendant. M. H.
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435,
211 Pac. 998.
This Court in Child v. Gillis Construction Co., 42 Utah
120 ,129 Pac. 356, involving the question raised by defendant
on appeal of plaintiffs' capacity as a real party in interest,

47

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appropriately summarized the doctrine involved by a statement
now of substantial importance to plaintiff in _this case, as
follows:
there is absolutely nothing shown how the
fact whether Mr. Child (Plaintiff in the action) was
principal or agent could in any way affect appellant's
legal rights, and hence the error, if in fact the court
committed such by not submitting the question of
agency to the jury as requested by appellant, is wholly
harmless. To reverse a case for such a reason under
sue h circumstances would amount almost to a travesty."
(Italics added)
B. Defendant is bound by the pre-trial order which did
not raise the defense of real party in interest. On file with this
Honorable Court is a complete transcript of the Pre-Trial
Hearing held on the 28th day of March, 195 5, wherein various
aspects of the discovery pleadings are settled (Pre-Trial Tr.
2-31) , counsel for both sides make a statement to the court
as to their respective contentions, (Pre-Trial Tr. 32-40) the
facts established by discovery techniques are reviewed, and
the Court ultimately entered a Pre-Trial Order based on the
rather lengthy arguments and discussion. The Pre-Trial Order
and the stipulation of ·codnsel with respect thereto (Pre-Trial
T r. 40-4 5) is as follows:
u

•

•

•

MR. HOLBROOK: nWe will be willing to submit it
on that basis, Your Honor. We have nothing further
to present to the court at this time."
THE COURT: nis that all right \vith you then the
way I have set it out?"
MR. ARNOVITZ: ~] think the issues substantially.
I've had some doubt as to whether the issue of forfeiture is in the complaint but I assume that Your
Honor now states that it becomes a part of the issues?,
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THE COURT: ({Well, of course when I say has there
been a forfeiture, has there been a breach of such a
nature that the defendant has lost any right to further
assert anything, it's assignment. That is the issue. And,
of course, that involves the question of law whether
under this contract he is entitled to a reassignment in
the event of a breach. I can make it a little bit more
specific. I will restate the issues. Is there such a lack
of mutuality in the contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit B, that
the plaintiff is entitled to a reassignment of the lease
to the school section described in the complaint?
nHas there been an abandonment of the contract,
Plaintiff's Exhibit B, on the part of the defendant ?
ctHas the defendant breached the contract, Plaintiff's
Exhibit B, and if there has been such a breach is the
plaintiff entitled to have the school section reassigned?
t]s the plaintiff entitled to damages, and if so, in
what amount?"
MR. ARNOVITZ: tel would also like to have stated,
if Your Honor please, an issue as counsel has referred
to it in his affidavit, an issue as to whether there has
been a waiver of either the breach or the abandonment."
THE COURT: nAil right. Has there been a waiver
of the abandonment if any has occurred and a waiver
of the breach if any has occurred? We will put it that
way then. And I will try and set the case of trial in
May. I won't set it for trial before the 15th of May,
is that agreeable." (Pre-trial Tr. 44-45).
A binding thread necessary to sustain the dignity of the
courts and the rights of litigants is the well-recognized rule
stated in King v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., (D. Ore. 1945)
68 F. Supp. 1019, 1021, 8 P.R. Serv. 16.32, Case 3, as follows:

''An admission by counsel in open court made part
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of the judicial record and used as a foundation for
judgment, is the most solemn and binding act. * * *
If courts cannot rely on admissions of counsel made in
pre-trial conferences, then that procedure has no validity."
The Federal Courts in interpreting Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Procedure, which is identical to the Utah Rule, have
frequently held that limitation of issues at a pre-trial conference bars consideration of other questions on appeal. Frank v.
Giesy: 4 F.R. Serv. 16.32, Case 1, 117 F.2d, 122 (C.C.A. 9th,
1941).
Nowhere in the pre-trial conference held in the present
case is there any mention of the defense concerning real party
in interest and as indicated in foregoing arguments this question was not raised by an appropriate pleading. In the case of
McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., I? F. R. Serv.
17a.44 Case I (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1953), the defendant raised the
issue that the insurance company and not the defendant was
the real party in interest. The court held that the right to have
the real party in interest on record as a plaintiff was a right
which was waived by the defendant. The court said:
((In the present case, after two years of procedural
maneuvering, the defendants presented their motion
four days before the day on which the case vvas set for
trial, where all parties had prepared and witnesses
had been brought from considerable distances. It is
hard to see how a motion could be less timely."
Certain! y all the factors of preparation, travel, and loss
of time apply equally to ~his case. Moreover, t~e question of
real party in interest was not raised until the tria~ was in progress, and then after an expressed waiver by failure to plead
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and include the issue in the pre-trial conference. Either a
waiver occurred or it was-a tactical maneuver designed to prevent preparation and defense to a question which would have
no bearing on the case in any event. To reverse such a case on
these technical grounds would surely be a travesty on justice.
Appellant in its attempt to establish some technical reason
for reversal alleges the failure of the Trial Court to enter a
formal pre-trial order. If it should be concluded that a formal
order executed by the court is a mandatory requirement, as
we have pointed out previously, such a failure in no way prejudiced the defendant. However, the practice of the Federal and
Utah courts under Rule 16 is not invariably to complete a
formal document designated as an order. This practice is
illustrated in Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal fudges,
1944, 4 F.R.D. 183, 192, where it is stated, as follows:
teA very usual practice is for the pre-trial judge to
dictate an order at the close of the conference in the
presence of counsel with the privilege on their part
to object to any part of it which does not accord with
their understanding. * * * In still other jurisdictions
the transcript of agreements reached and of the issues
in their streamlined form as developed at the conference is itself considered as a pre-trial order which
guides the course of the trial."
The Lower Court in this case followed this recognized
practice in every respect. After the issues were settled by stipulation of counsel in the pre-trial conference, the Lower Court
in the presence of counsel, affording them every opportunity
to amend and object, dictated the pre-trial order to the reporter. Surely such a procedure is in complete harmony with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and with the fundamental
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basis of interpretation therein set out in Rule 1, that the Rules
((shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
C. The trial court allowed defendant every opportunity
to present evidence concerning the real party in interest.

There is no question in this ~ase but what defendant intended to search for something in the trial which was completely immaterial and irrelevant to the issues, which was
unsuppor_ted by a sufficient pleading, v.:hich was waived by
defendant in the pre-trial conference, and which_ could not be
prejudicial to defendant's case in any event. Notwithstanding,
defendant was given everr. opportunity by the Lower Court to
pursue its inquiry in proper form which would not delay,
handicap and confuse the trial of the case. The Lower Court
did not, as stated by appellant in its brief, ttsternly refuse to
permit counsel for defendant even to inquire into the subject."
On the contrary, the Cou~t indicated to counsel for defendant
that he may use every discovery technique following the close
of the trial and that he would be heard on a motion for a new
trial in the event any factor appeared which would be prejudicial to the defendant's case. The Court said:
~ ~.

. . and if at the close of this case I decide it and
you are dissatisfied with my decision I will let you use
discovery and I will hear you on any motion for a new
trial if you make the discovery that there is something
growing out of this thing that you mentioned of this
man paying the rentals to the State Land Board."
(R. 45-46)
Even in the light of this authorization defendant did not
see fit to embark upon the inquiry but in the motion for a new
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trial supported his allegat.ion that plaintiffs were not the real
parties in interest by a vague affidavit based on hearsay.
This procedure was certainly a proper exercise of judicial
discretion and an effective use of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 27 (b) pr<?vides in part t~at tcbefore the taking
of an appeal if the time therefore has not expired, the district
court in which the judgme~t was rendered may allow the taking
of depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for
use in the event of further proceedings in such court,'' and
Rule 59 provides that tcthe court may open the judgment if one
has been entered, make additional testimony, amend findings
of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment."
The evidence presented by defendant in the motion for
a new trial was, as indicat~d above, a vague, hearsay affidavit
merely perpetuating an unwarranted stispicion, which could
have no substance even if the Lower Court had allowed the
delay and confusion of a so-called fish~ng expedition at the
time of trial. A valid exercise of judicial discretion should not
be disturbed on appeal.

D. The Trial Court properly allow·ed amendment as to
parties plaintiff.

Appellant takes exception to the procedure followed by
the Lower Court in allowing joinder of Earl Craig as a party
plaintiff. Appellant alleges_ that the addition of Earl Craig as a
party plaintiff in the action was without competent evidence
and based upon the oral representations of counsel. We must
assume that appellant does not advance the proposition that
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an attorney is not fJ..Illy competent to represent to a court his
authority to sue for a party; the contrary to this proposition
is too firmly established in our judicial system by everyday
practice to warrant further argument. Appellant- must be contending, therefore, that there was no evidence before the court
as to Earl Craig's interest it?- the subject matter of the litigation.
Again appellant conveniently overlooks i~s own evidence in
this regard. Actually counsel for defendant offered as evidence
records from the County Recorder's office showing a partial
assignment of the Utah State Land Board Lease to Earl Craig
by plaintiff Harold Best (R. 37). After representations by
counsel for plaintiff that he was authorized to represent Earl
Craig for any interest he may have in the subject matter of
the litigation (R. 39) and upon plaintiff's motion, Earl Craig
was joined as a party plaintiff in the lawsuit. This procedure
is in complete harmony with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21, which provides as follows:
ttMis-joinder of parties is not ground for dismissal
of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and
proceeded with separately."
Action of the court under this rule is a matter of judicial
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear
abuse is shown. Weaver v. Marcus} ( C.C.A. 4th, 1948) 165 F.2d
862. The breadth of the lower court's discretion is shown by
the power to add or drop parties on the court's own initiative.
Paper Container Mfg. Co. v. Dixie Cup Co.J (D.C. Del. 1947),
74 F. Supp. 389.
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In the case of Automatic Dialing Corp. v. Maritime
Quality Hardware Co., 16 F.R. Serv. 17a.13. Case 2, 98 F. Supp.
650, arising as a result Qf a breakdown of contractural relationships, judgment was awarded to defendant on its counterclaim. In the trial on the merits before the court, ((exhaustive
testimony was taken, numerous exhibits were filed with the
court, and extensive briefs have been submitted to the court by
all parties."
After judgment plaintiff raised the issue as to the capacity
of defendant to prosecute its counter-claim in view of the real
party in interest rule. Plaintiff introduced an assignment from
defendant to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of all
monies due or to become due from plaintiff. The court received from counsel for the RFC a statement that the agency
consents to the jurisdiction of the court to be joined as a party
to the counter-claim in the action. The court held as follows:
((It is in the interest of justice to all parties that the
RFC be made a party to the present action, thus meeting the requirements of the Real Party In Interest Rule,
and concluding the case for all the parties concerned.
Therefore, by virtue of authority vested in it by Rules
13 (h) and 21 of The Federal Rules of Procedure,
this court will order that the RFC be joined as a defendant herein * * * This court considers that the
consent of the RFC in this regard is a highly commendable step, in eliminating the possibility of a rehearing
of the evidence in this somewhat complex case."
The hearty endorsement of the court of the procedure
followed in joining RFC as an additional party after judgment was entered, would, we believe, receive like approval in
this case if we were able to fulfill defendant's suspicion that
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someone other than Harold Best and Earl Craig are real parties
to this litigation. Defendant has nothing to gain by such a
discovery and plaintiffs have nothing to lose by such a revelation. Defendant has fulfilled its desire that any party whose
interest has been shown be joined in the action, and to claim
prejudice as a result is again indicative of defendant's attempt
to avoid the Lower Court's judgment with misleading and contradictory arguments.

CONCLUSION
Defendant's brief intermittently reflects alleged facts
adeptly twisted to coincide with random selections of abstract
general law.
Plaintiffs have stated facts established by the record and
have harmoniously joined these facts with authorities, directly
and conclusively establishing the reason and justice supporting
the judgment of the Trial Court. As the Trial Court observed
the evasiye witnesses and drew conclusions as _to veracity and
import of the testimony,_ so also will the Appellate Court
analyze the issues and law and distinguish the sound and just
from the evasive and indecisive.
Defendant manifested every inten~ion and performed
every act of abandonment. Conversely, defendant did nothing
to fulfill its duties of development and operation of the properties, again indicating an abandonment, and in the alternative,
resulting in a forfe~ture, and yet defendant asks this Court to
look with pleasure upon a continuance of the assignment in
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face of the paradox that it has taken no positi~e action, and
indeed contends that nothing need be accomplished.
Defendant is caught in the inconsistent mire of its arguments and is forced into an abortive reliance on real parties in
interest and alleged error in the proceedings, which are in fact
non-existent and in no event prejudicial.
It has been made abundantly clear through the means of
a careful briefing of defe11:dant' s authorities that its position is
without any support what~oever.
Under the state of the record, the findings of the Trial
Court and the only conceivable remedy should not be disturbed
on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

HOLBROOK, BAUCOM & WILKINS
Attorneys for Respondents
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